This paper analyzes the advantages of third-party credit reporting agencies over traditional credit bureaus and shows that third-party credit reporting agencies provide a convenient financing approach for SMEs among countries along the "The Belt and Road". Taking China as an example, it introduces the development status of China's third-party credit reporting agencies, reveals the obstacles to the operation of third-party credit reporting agencies, and uses game theory to analyze the operational obstructions of reputation restrictions of third-party credit reporting agencies. When extra profits from illegal operations of agencies and cost of supervision by the official regulator are high, agencies have more incentive to take irregularities; when the punishment towards credit rating agency's violations is heavy, reputation loss of the agencies is enough, rewards for official regulators to successfully investigate violations of agencies are rich, the punishment for the official regulators failing to investigate the illegal operation of agencies and punishment for the official regulators failing to investigate the illegal operation of are heavy, credit reporting agencies have less incentive to take irregularities. After above analysis, measures of improving the third-party credit reporting agencies' reputation constraint are put forward.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the "The Belt and Road" initiative has been proposed for five years, many countries along the Belt and Road have reached a number of cooperation in financial cooperation, and the third-party credit reporting agencies, instead of the traditional credit reporting agency led by the credit reporting center of central bank who has mainly served the key state-owned enterprises and large projects, work as an important financial approach for SMEs to obtain funds. However, in the process of credit investigation, due to the autonomy of third-party credit reporting agencies in terms of their willingness and motivation to restrain their reputation, they have created barriers to reputation and reduced the credit and financing efficiency of SMEs along the Belt and Road. This article takes a Chinese third-party credit reporting agencies as an example to profoundly analyze the barriers to third-party credit bureaucracies' reputation constraint.
B. Market Demand for Third-party Credit Reporting is Increasingly Strong
The rapid growth of total credit in China has brought the increasing market for third-party credit reporting industry. In December 2016, China's domestic household loans were 33.4 trillion yuan, of which consumer loans were 25.1 trillion yuan and operating loans were 830 million, accounting for 75% and 25% respectively. Comparing with the same period of 2015, it increased by 7.4% and the amount of increase was 7.3 trillion RMB. The credit market growth has provided market space for third-party credit reporting businesses.
There are many small and medium-sized enterprises in China, bringing the problem that financing is too difficult and expensive to get. SAIC data show that in 2016, due to lack of data , imperfect credit rating, failure of banks and other financial institutions to judge their business risks ,China had a total of 80,705,000 market players, but only a few enterprises obtained loans from financial institutions like banks, which will further promote the development and expansion of third-party third-party credit reporting agencies in China.
III. THE BASIC CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL OBSTRUCTIONS OF REPUTATION CONSTRAINTS OF THIRD-PARTY CREDIT REPORTING AGENCY

A. The Basic Concept of the Reputation Constraints of
Third-party Credit Reporting Agencies Reputation constraint means that the stakeholder in the market is bound by the non-standard behavior of the third-party credit reporting agencies and is the concrete manifestation of the market constraint in the third-party third-party credit reporting industry. The reputation market must satisfy the two stages of the process which are the screening process and the control process. Stakeholders identify the risk management activities of third-party credit reporting agencies and further implement controls to eliminate the opportunistic behavior of third-party credit reporting agencies. Here the stakeholders are the main body of the market constraint, including the main stakeholders of direct interest-investors and indirect stakeholders -industry associations. Schwarcz [1] argues that because third-party credit reporting agencies are directly linked to reputation, profits are motivated to provide accurate and sufficient credit ratings. However, the outbreak of a series of credit crises has proved that the reputation constraint is not so effective. Frost (2007) [2] argues that the failure to consider reputation constraints lies in the barriers and potential conflicts of interest set by third-party third-party credit reporting agencies.
B. Operational Obstructions of Reputation Constraints of
Third-party Credit Reporting Agencies
1) Potential conflicts of interest a) Third-party credit reporting agencies rely on third-party credit reporting fees
Companies or organizations applying for a rating need to pay a rating fee, which generally includes initial fees and annual maintenance fees. The potential for conflict of interest arises because third-party credit reporting agencies may be tempted by high rating fees and make lenient assessments for client companies. In addition, large companies may use their influence to put pressure on third-party credit reporting agencies.
b) Development of subsidiary business
If a customer purchases ancillary services, the third-party credit reporting agencies may offer a credit rating, even if the information collected does not support this rating. Although the current subsidiary business accounts for a small share of the business of third-party credit reporting agencies, with the diversification of development, such potential conflicts of interest should arouse the attention of regulators.
2) The disclosure of third-party credit reporting information is not clear a) The transparency of the third-party credit reporting process
To the public, the third-party credit reporting process seems like a "black box" and they do not understand how credit ratings are generated. The lack of transparency of third-party credit reporting agencies creates an island effect on information such as the number of companies each analyst is responsible for analyzing, the frequency of formal reviews, the frequency of official reviews on a quarterly basis, and the number of companies rated quarterly or annually.
b) The rating result information is asymmetric
Although third-party credit reporting agencies claim that both the public and ratings users will be notified of the rating results at the same time, users of the rating results will get more detailed information, and they can even talk with analysts and get the rating results ahead of time, causing the leaked information.
c) The quality of analysts can not be standardized Normally, analysts rate their clients based on the offered information rating, but seldom review the accuracy and completeness of that. Hard-working standard of credit analysts is difficult to determine, thus affecting the fact that third-party credit reporting quality is difficult to guarantee.
IV. ANALYSIS OF REPUTATION CONSTRAINTS OF THIRD-PARTY
CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES BASED ON GAME THEORY Assuming that any player in the game fully understands the benefits of himself and his opponent in various situations during the game, and the decisions made are completely rational, and they make a decision at the same time, that is,for the third-party credit reporting agencies and the official regulator all information is complete. Therefore, a static game model between third-party credit reporting agencies and official supervisors is established.
A. Participants and Hypothesis 1) Participants
There are two participants in the official regulatory game: (1) The regulatory body. It is an important guarantee to regulate the behavior of third-party credit reporting agencies in order to eliminate irregular behaviors of third-party credit reporting agencies. (2) third-party credit reporting agencies. The main task of a third-party credit reporting agencies is to follow an independent standpoint and uphold the principles of p E 1 E   independence, objectivity and fairness, use a standardized rating system and criteria, apply a scientific method of rating, perform a rigorous rating process, in order to reveal the credit risk of rating object. There is strategic dependency between regulators and third-party credit reporting agencies. From the point of third-party credit reporting agencies, its strategy includes two:First they would pay attention to reputation, rate with caution , that is ,third-party credit reporting agencies adopt strict evaluation criteria to lower error ; Secondly, they would not pay attention to reputation, rate with no standard, that is, third-party credit reporting agencies adopt loose evaluation criteria and get the low accuracy and low cost. The probabilities of the two are denoted by P and 1-P, respectively. From the regulatory perspective, the strategies are respectively to supervise and not supervise third-party credit reporting agencies. q and 1-q, respectively, represent the probabilities that the official regulate and not regulate toward third-party credit reporting agencies.
2) Hypothesis
To facilitate the analysis, the following hypothesis are made:
Hypothesis 1: Both parties involved in the game are rational, and they will make the most rational decisions under certain constraints.
Hypothesis 2: The efficiency of the official is high, which means once a third-party credit reporting agencies conducts illegal operations or unfair ratings, it must be detected and imposed a certain amount of fines as long as the official regulates it . The penalty amount is a certain percentage of the revenue of this business, here assumed to be k (0 <k <1). At the same time the regulator need to be paid as for travel costs , on-site inspection costs and so on, here assumed to be T. Hypothesis 3: If the official regulator does not perform regulatory functions, and the third-party credit reporting agencies conduct unfair ratings and the graded products have breached the contract, they will be punished by the higher authorities. Here we assume the punishment fee is M. If the official regulator performs the regulatory function and investigates the unfair conduct or irregularities of the third-party credit reporting agencies, the regulator will be rewarded W for the increasing prestige recognized and affirmed by the public.
Hypothesis 4: In addition to be punished by fines, the investigated third-party credit reporting agencies will also be disclosed to public investors in a certain form by the government regulators, which will increase the reputation loss of third-party credit reporting agencies, thus further affect the third-party credit reporting agencies operations, bring problem that investors no longer believe rating result given by the third-party credit reporting agencies and the issuing company will not buy the third-party credit reporting agencies products. Its market share will continue to decline until it disappears completely in the market. This loss is measured as L.
Hypothesis 5: third-party credit reporting agencies need to pay a certain amount of credit-rating cost positively related to the quality of third-party credit reporting products. If a third-party credit reporting agencies conducts a fair rating, adopts strict evaluation criteria, the cost will be higher. Conversely, if the more loosing evaluation criteria is used, the higher of error rate is, the less time and energy is spent ,then the lower of the cost will be. c represents the cost, of which C1 corresponds to the cost of compliance operations, C2 corresponds to the cost of non-compliance operations respectively, and C1>C2. R represents the business income obtained by third-party credit reporting agencies. 
B. Static Game Equilibrium Analysis
THE PAYMENT MATRIX OF OFFICIAL REGULATORS AND CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES
Treasure reputation (fair rating) Do Not Treasure reputation (unfair rating)
Regulate(p)
The expected earnings of the third-party credit reporting agencies and the official regulator are represented as E1 and E2 respectively:
Deriving E1 from p, we get the first derivative condition that third-party credit reportinginstitution pays attention to reputation (fair rating)
=C2-C1+qRk+qL=0
(1)
Derive E2 from p and obtain the first derivative condition for the optimization of official supervision: (1) (2), we get the optimal probability q* of official regulation and the optimal probability p* of third-party credit reporting agencies' compliance operation under the equilibrium state: 
1) The Influencing factors of optimum Probability q* for Official Regulators
From (1), we can see that the optimal probability q* of the official regulator is affected by the cost spread C1-C2 of fair rating and unfair rating, penalty factor k and reputation loss L caused by unfair rating.
The larger C1-C2, the greater the optimal supervision probability of the official regulator.
Find the first derivative of q* for C1-C2 :
That is, q* is a monotonically increasing function of C1-C2. In other words, the larger the gap of costs between compliance and non-compliance , the more likely regulatory oversight will be provided by the official regulator. Therefore, third-party credit reporting agencies tend to prefer non-compliant operations to reduce costs when targeting the same capital markets. If there is not much difference between the two, the third-party credit reporting agencies will consider other factors to conduct the behavior selection. If the gap between the two is larger, meaning that the higher the extra profit from illegal operations, the more motivated the third-party credit reporting agencies is to take the irregularities and the greater the probability of optimal regulation. The greater the intensity of the official supervisory penalty punishment, the less the optimal supervision probability of the official supervisor. Find the first derivative of q* for k:
That is, q* is a monotonically decreasing function of k. In other words, when the third-party credit reporting agencies' irregularities are found and penalized heavier, the third-party credit reporting agencies' motivation to run illegally will be less, and official's vigor to regulate will be less correspondingly.
The greater the reputation loss of a third-party credit reporting agencies, the smaller the probability of unfair rating.
Find the first derivative of q* for L:
That is, q* is a monotonically decreasing function of L. In other words, the greater of reputation loss caused by illegal operation, the less motivated the third-party credit reporting agencies is to unfairly rate, and official's vigor to regulate will be less correspondingly.
2) The influencing Factors of optimum Probability p* for third-party credit reporting agencies
The larger the cost of supervision by the official regulator, the smaller the probability of fair rating by the third-party credit reporting agencies.
Find the first derivative of p* for T:
<0
Regulators will provide less regulation when regulatory costs are higher. Therefore, the probability of operating in compliance with the requirement and providing a correct and fair rating will be less. Instead of strict rating method, loosing standard will be adopted and credit reports full of errors will be offered to the public.
The bigger the reward to the official for the successful investigation and punishment of a non-operating third-party credit reporting agencies, the greater the probability that a third-party credit reporting agencies will rate fairly.
Find the first derivative of p* for W :
>0
The official tends to regulate strictly when it comes to the bigger reward for the reason that it successfully investigates and deals with the third-party credit reporting agencies operating illegally, in which case, the higher the probability that a third-party credit reporting agencies is investigated and fined, the greater the probability of its compliance management.
c) The heavier punishment M for the reason that the official failed to investigate and deal with the non-compliance of the third-party credit reporting agencies , the higher the probability that the third-party credit reporting agencies will be impartially graded. 
The regulators tends to censor strictly when regulators are fined more and bring more negative effects as for their neglect of duty, in which case the higher the probability that a third-party credit reporting agencies is investigated and fined, the greater the probability of its compliance operation.
V. MEASURES OF IMPROVING THE THIRD-PARTY CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES' REPRTATION CONSTRAINT
A. To Promote the Reasonableness and Effectiveness of Information Disclosure
The primary task of cultivating the reputation constraint of the third-party third-party credit reporting industry in China is to complete the information disclosure of the third-party credit rating. Improving the transparency of third-party credit reporting agencies through information disclosure and increasing investors' understanding about the operation of third-party credit reporting agencies can facilitate the implementation of reputation constraints [3] .
